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I. INTRODUCTION
errorists are front and center in today's world. Global terrorists incite outrage and fear. They lead to much hand-wringing and the expenditure of countless sums. The concept of home-grown terrorists has also entered the national security nomenclature, perhaps more reviled because, locally born and bred, they are reasonably expected to have fealty rather than enmity towards their country of origin. Then there is a local terrorist of another sort: the intimate terrorist. is "violence deployed in the service of general control" over a partner. 3 With the threat of violence as a cudgel, the intimate terrorist may be able to exercise non-violent control over a partner by: (1) threats and intimidation; (2) monitoring; (3) undermining the will to resist; and (4) undermining the ability to resist. 4 Intimate terrorists have long coercively controlled their partners using both violent and non-violent methods. Modern technology now makes this exercise of control much easier. How the ubiquity of technology has enhanced the intimate terrorist's powers can be examined through the fictional character of Frances Flynn Benedetto.
Fran is the emergency room nurse, mother, and long-time battered woman at the center of Anna Quindlen's novel, Black and Blue. 5 Set in the late 1990s, the story relays how Fran escaped, with her son Robert, from her husband Bobby. Bobby Benedetto was a police officer and intimate terrorist. At one point during the years of violence before Fran left, she came to the realization that she could not just leave; rather, she would have to disappear. 6 Finally, after one beating too many, Fran contacted a woman whom she had heard speak at a session on domestic violence for emergency room personnel at her hospital. That woman, Patty Bancroft, helped victims escape. Within hours of the contact, Patty provided Fran and her son Robert with new identities and had them chauffeured to Philadelphia. In the Philadelphia train station, a stranger dropped train tickets on the floor near where Fran and her son stood; the tickets were for them. They boarded a train to 1 MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM, VIOLENT RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE (2008) . 2 Id.
3 Id. at 6. 4 Id. at 26-29. 5 ANNA QUINDLEN, BLACK AND BLUE (1998). 6 Id. at 73.
T Florida, where another stranger picked them up and delivered them to a shabby apartment to begin a new life. Secrecy, Patty Bancroft had told the emergency room staff, is the key to helping battered women successfully escape their tormentors. 7 Unfortunately, in this high-tech age, secrecy can be hard to achieve 8 and its relative, privacy, is an antiquated notion. Technology has dramatically shifted what, how, and to whom information is disclosed. Social intercourse is now conducted through the varied media that fit loosely within the technology rubric. People communicate to the multitudes through social media, e.g. Facebook and Twitter, as well as receive communication in this manner from friends or celebrities.
On an individual basis, texting has supplanted the more oldfashioned mobile telephone call or even email. AAA TripTiks have gone the way of the rotary telephone. GPS programs on phones and computer tablets provide directions, of course, but also real-time monitoring and geolocation.
9
Small electronics with advanced technological capacity are now practically appendages for many.
Benefits and pleasures accrue from technology, but detriments and horrors also lurk therein. Nowhere are these negative uses of technology more apparent than in the area of intimate terrorism. Intimate terrorism is centuries old. Once authorized by law, 10 it is now outlawed. But it is a persistent crime, eluding laws to stop; technology has made it easier.
Although the impact of technology on domestic violence has been discussed for some years in varied literature, 11 the ways in which the 7 Id. at 63. 8 This article begins with a brief intimate terrorism primer. It then proceeds to examine some of the specific ways in which technological issues affect domestic violence. This discussion will include how technology-broadly defined-has been useful in combating intimate terrorism. It will also explore ways in which technology has increased the capacity of the intimate terrorist. Next, the article will consider some recent legislative efforts to confront the problem of domestic violence and technology. Finally, after examining the current legal landscape, the article will discuss some issues that still need attention.
II. INTIMATE TERRORISM AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
In A Typology of Domestic Violence, 13 Michael P. Johnson laments domestic violence generalizations and sets out to identify subsets within the larger rubric. After analyzing the available research and literature, he argues that there are four distinct types of domestic violence: intimate terrorism, violent resistance, situational couples violence, and mutual violent control.
14 Of these types, intimate terrorism most closely resembles the prototypical pattern of domestic violence, which is now understood as, at its core, being about coercive control of the victim/survivor.
15
The other types of domestic violence identified by Johnson do not involve "coercive control." 16 They may 12 See discussion infra Part III.A. 13 JOHNSON, supra note 1. 14 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 7-12. 15 It has become common to refer to survivors rather than victims. However, some don't survive. Nonetheless, the terms victim and survivor will be used interchangeably in this article. 16 Coverage of household members could and should include intimate partners who live together but also may include, for instance, law school roommates. Thus, the remedies in these statutes, which are designed primarily to protect those who are being coercively controlled, are illsuited as a response to an altercation between non-intimate roommates.
In addition to enlarging the categories of protected persons, states are paying more attention to the insidious linkage between intimate terrorism and other areas. For instance, after decades of denying the interrelationship between child rearing and intimate terrorism, most states now permit or mandate that judges consider past or extant domestic violence when determining child custody. 22 After years of blindness towards the co-existence between child abuse and intimate terrorism, many child protection agencies now have domestic violence experts housed within the agency.
23
This represents the sensible realization that helping a mother who is a victim of intimate terrorism has benefits that redound to the child. 24 Prosecutors, law enforcement, and criminal courts have also altered their approaches. The mandatory arrest and mandatory prosecution waves of the 1990s changed the ways that police interact at the scene and how prosecutors treat these cases in court. New crimes have been legislated, such as criminalizing the violation of a protection order.
25
Batterers' treatment programs, although controversial, are increasingly common.
26
Statutes authorizing the global positioning system (GPS) monitoring of offenders are among the current legal changes underway.
27
The majority of laws concerning domestic violence are found at the state level. However, federal laws now aid in combating the societal scourge of intimate terrorism. Most prominent is the Violence 21 See infra Part V.C. 22 27 See discussion infra Part IV.
Against Women Act.
28
Other federal enactments include laws against stalking, itself a relatively new crime that is carried out disproportionately by intimate or formerly intimate partners.
29
The obvious progress notwithstanding, much work remains. Critics justly lament the legal system's inability to effectively deal with the problem despite the increased attention and resources that have been provided. 30 Further, some of the advancements have supplied a new crop of problems. For instance, increased public awareness and new laws have led to the perception, and the occasional reality, that the system is being gamed to gain advantage in custody and divorce proceedings or, more perniciously, is simply anti-male. On the other hand, there is a view among victims, batterers, and on-lookers alike that a protection order is a piece of paper that offers little protection.
31
In Black and Blue, Fran talked about how batterers and victims both viewed a protection order as "a joke, made, as they say, to be broken."
32
Intimate terrorism is thus a dance that consists of one step forward and two steps backward or two steps forward and one step backward. Whatever the precise choreography at a given moment, much is left to do. Into this current state of affairs, technology has been thrust and is a reality that demands a reckoning.
33
III. INTIMATE TERRORISM AND TECHNOLOGY
Technology is a two-way street. It can give an intimate terrorist enhanced capacity to threaten, intimidate, and monitor his victim; it can also be used to benefit a survivor. GPS technology can track intimate terrorists to an effort to ensure they stay away from court- Technology leaves a trail in its wake; that trail may be admissible in court against an intimate terrorist. 35 Further, to successfully escape, a survivor must create a plan that helps her get or keep away from the perpetrator.
36
On-line resources can be invaluable to a survivor in her efforts to escape. However, online research can be perilous for a survivor. An intimate terrorist can, through the use of spyware or keystroke technology, ascertain the details of a survivor's computer usage. 37 These details may reveal the resources a survivor has used to get help or how she is planning to escape.
38
A perpetrator's increased access, by virtue of technology, to a survivor's plans for escape-either from a shared household or from the relationship-places the survivor at increased risk of harm due to the phenomenon known as separation assault. 39 Separation assault means that the survivor is at greater risk when she is seeking to leave the batterer. When one accepts that intimate terrorism is about the perpetrator's coercive control of his partner-or ex-partner-separation assault is sadly predictable. The perpetrator realizes that his efforts at control are failing when he learns of his victim's plans to leave. He then redoubles his attempts to control, often leading to assault at the time of separation.
In Black and Blue, where the violence continued for years, one might long to ask . 37 See infra Part III.B.2. 38 See Dimond, supra note 33 (many advocacy websites now instruct victims on how to lessen, if not eliminate their non-paper trail. For instance the Nat'l Network to End Domestic Violence has the following message on its website's homepage: "SAFETY ALERT: If you are in danger, please use a safer computer, or call 911, a local hotline, or the U.S. Nat'l Domestic Violence Hotline at 1-800-799-7233 and TTY 1-800-787-3224. Learn more technology safety tips. There is always a computer trail, but you can leave this site quickly."). 39 individual survivor might respond to the "why did you stay?" query, it is now axiomatically regarded as the wrong question: a question that blames the survivor for the violence she endures.
41
But Fran did ultimately leave-or disappear as she would have said. 42 After the abuse increased in severity and she realized the impact of it on her son, she reached out to people who could help her escape. At the nucleus of her exit strategy was her ability to remain hidden from Bobby, her husband as well as her intimate terrorist.
Here's where the insidiousness of technology comes into play. If Bobby had access to technology, he could have coercively controlled Fran, in part through monitoring her activities. 43 He could have found out what friends or professionals she was contacting to assist in her escape by accessing her computer through spyware or through her improvident posts on social networking sites. 44 In that way, he may have been able to prevent her from escaping in the first place.
As it was, Bobby had to wait until his son surreptitiously called him, at which point he used his police contacts to unscramble the telephone number. 45 Today, however, Bobby could have found Fran by virtue of GPS technology on his son's phone. He would not have needed his police contacts.
A. Taxonomy of Technology: Definitions and Uses
Technology is difficult to define. While certain understandings are summoned up by the use of various terms, a precise shared meaning is often lacking. Although common understandings may be elusive, two diverse examples of recent technologies that are used in intimate terrorism are defined as follows: (1) social media: "forms of electronic 41 The question has staying power because it is difficult for those not enmeshed in a domestic violence situation to truly understand the power that an intimate terrorist has against his victim. Two of the four factors that Johnson uses to define the intimate terrorist are undermining the will to resist and undermining the ability to resist. An understanding of these two factors explains why she didn't leave. Getting to a place where the question itself is rarely asked is a larger, perhaps impossible, task. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 269. 42 communication (as Web sites for social networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal message, and other content"; (2) global positioning system: "a navigational system using satellite signals to fix the location of a radio receiver on or above the earth's surface: also the radio receiver so used."
46
Although these terms are capable of definition, they are inherently inexact. The vast fluidity in the definitions has created problems crafting legal responses such as appropriate legislation, where the clear definition of terms is critical to proper application of the law to cover its intended purpose. 47 Also, technology can transform common items, such as a telephone, with new uses that stretch the law. In one case, an appellate court refused to sustain a conviction for harassing telephone calls because, although a telephone was used, the messages came via text. Texting was beyond the meaning of the statute. 48 Thus, harassing telephone calls were illegal, but the same texted content via the same device (a telephone) was not. This information is stored on a miniscule hard drive and allows access to typically confidential items such as passwords and personal identification numbers. It is also reported that this technology is installed on certain smart phones.
B. How Technology is Used in Intimate Terrorism
61
Spyware and keystroke technology have legitimate purposes. They can be used, for example, to appropriately monitor a child's computer usage. But, these technologies are easily used by intimate terrorists to monitor their victims. Imagine if Bobby could access all websites that Fran visited, all the emails or texts that she sent, all telephone calls that she made, as well as any activity on their on-line bank account. In this highly digitized age, it would be nearly impossible for Fran to escape Bobby without using computers, telephones, or internet resources.
Global Positioning Systems
A GPS is a navigational system that uses satellite signals to fix the location of a radio receiver.
62
Unstated but implicit is this: if the radio receiver is affixed to something, the location of that something is known or knowable. The radio receiver can be attached to or designed into a car.
63
It can be part of a smart phone or tablet computer that accompanies a person throughout the day.
64
GPS technology can be used easily by intimate terrorists. Survivors who are trying to escape their abusers or think they have already done so can be tracked constantly. As one private investigator put it, the technology "to the victim is just as terrorizing as seeing [ window at night before they [sic] go to bed." 65 Threats and intimidation, monitoring, undermining the will of the victim to resist, and undermining the ability of the victim to resist: these are the tactics of the intimate terrorist. 66 Each of these tactics is made easier, scarier, and deadlier by the technologies described above.
67
IV. LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON INTIMATE TERRORISM
A. Anti-Stalking Statutes
Stalking and intimate terrorism can go hand-in-hand. Stalking behavior goes to the heart of the intimate terrorist's monitoring strategy as described by Johnson. 68 Technology can make the stalker appear omnipresent and omniscient to the victim. GPS technology, whether on cars or telephones, allows an intimate terrorist to know the whereabouts of his victim at all times. 69 Her attempts to evade him are ineffectual as technology makes her easy to find. In one case, for instance, a husband put a GPS tracking device on his wife's car and installed spyware on her cell phone. The wife left after a domestic violence incident, but her husband sent her text messages demonstrating that he knew her whereabouts and was monitoring her. 70 Stalking is a relatively new crime. 71 It gained notoriety early on in several high profile cases where the stalker was obsessed with the victim, but did not know her personally. 72 In reality, however, stalking is not usually a crime between strangers. Stalkers know their victims; UMass Law Review v. 7 | 10 77% of female stalking victims are stalked by someone they know and 59% are stalked by current or former intimate partners. 73 All states now have anti-stalking statutes. 74 Congress passed an anti-stalking statute in 1996. 75 Unfortunately, technology has made some of these statutes virtually obsolete and, in some circumstances, counterproductive. Original anti-stalking statutes often required the stalker to be visually or physically proximate to the victim. Now, however, the victim can be found and stalked remotely. The stalker can access her computer or smart phone. Even for the non-tech savvy person, technological stalking is surprisingly easy. On-line step-bystep instructions chillingly show the way. 76 The impact of technology on the crime of stalking was addressed in the 2007 revision of the Model Stalking Code. Domestic violence/GPS (hereinafter "DV/GPS") statutes may be categorized by whether they sanction monitoring in the pre-trial or post-conviction phase. Some statutes permit GPS monitoring as part of conditional release for persons accused of violating a protection order.
88
Other statutes apply only after a person has been found guilty of a crime involving domestic violence-perhaps the violation of a protection order, perhaps another crime-and receives probation rather than jail or prison time. 89 82 Id. 83 The Model Stalking Statute Revisited, supra note 29, at 64. 84 The DV/GPS statutes generally use the term domestic violence, so that term, rather than intimate terrorism, will be used through this section. 85 monitoring. 99 Further, the judicial officer must seek input from a victim as to the areas from which the defendant is to be excluded. The judicial officer also must provide the victim with information regarding: 1) her right to participate or refuse to participate; 2) the functioning and limitations of the technology and "the extent to which the system will track and record the victim's location and movements; 3) the locations from which the defendant is barred; 4) sanctions available in the event of a violation; 5) the procedures to follow if the GPS monitoring fails; and 6) the lack of confidentiality for the victim's communications with the court. 100 
Post-Conviction Monitoring
Other states permit DV/GPS monitoring only after a defendant has been found to have violated an order of protection. 101 Massachusetts was one of the first states to enact DV/GPS legislation. In 2007, it amended its Abuse Prevention statute (209A) to provide that a court may, in lieu of incarceration and as a condition of probation, order that a defendant "wear a global positioning satellite tracking device designed to transmit and record the defendant's location data." 102 If a defendant enters an "exclusion zone," that information is transmitted "immediately" to the victim and the police. 103 A court finding that the defendant entered the exclusion zone will result in the revocation of probation. Although this statute is more than four years old, as of January 2012, just 96 DV offenders were wearing GPS monitors and being tracked by the Massachusetts Department of Probation. 104 In Kentucky, GPS monitoring is also an option only after a defendant has been found to have engaged in a "substantial violation" of a protection order. 105 The court, before imposing monitoring, must give the victim certain information, similar to that mandated in Texas. 106 The Kentucky statute also specifically gives the offender the right to provide information as to why monitoring ought not be imposed. 107 Before ordering monitoring, the court must consider the likelihood that the offender will "seek to kill, assault, stalk, harass, menace, or otherwise threaten" the victim without the imposition of GPS monitoring.
108
The court is also required to make findings of fact regarding the granting or denying of a monitoring request. Several states allow for GPS monitoring after either a charge and or a conviction. In Oklahoma, for instance, a defendant who is alleged to have either violated a protection order or committed other offenses of domestic violence, including stalking, may be required to use a GPS monitoring device. 110 Before entering such an order, the court must find that the defendant has a "history that demonstrates an intent to commit violence against the victim . . . " 111 In addition, the court may permit the victim to monitor the defendant's location; however, the statute specifically limits monitoring by the victim to areas that implicate her safety. 112 Oklahoma also permits the use of GPS monitoring of a defendant who has been convicted of violating a protective order. 113 Illinois similarly permits both pre-trial and postconviction monitoring. 
Constitutional Issues
The use of GPS technology in law enforcement has been challenged on a variety of grounds. 115 In U.S. v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the police may not install a GPS device on a suspect's car without a valid search warrant. 116 The case raised legal issues largely different from those found in DV/GPS statutes; its impact, therefore, is indirect.
117
The opinion does provide a window, however, into the Court's thinking on the Fourth Amendment considerations of GPS monitoring. 118 Although unanimous in outcome, the Court split 5-4 in its rationale. The five person majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, found that the placement and use of the device on Jones's car was a search.
119
Scalia's majority opinion focused on the physical intrusion involved in planting the device, which was the basis for search and seizure law until the 1960s. 120 However, more recent Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence has focused on reasonable expectations of privacy, not on physical intrusions. 121 Therefore, the impact of a return to a property-based inquiry remains to be seen. Certainly, it is a curious twist for a technology case, as 117 Santry, supra note 10, at 1110-14 (for instance, DV offenders are monitored so that they do not enter into exclusions zones-such places that the victim inhabits-that have already been legally declared off-limits in a protection order. Offenders, therefore, would be unable to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in these areas).
118 Although Jones involved drugs, GPS tracking by police could be used in cases involving domestic violence. In Wisconsin v. Sveum, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the police use of GPS to track an alleged stalker, notwithstanding assertions of Fourth Amendment violations. Wisconsin v. Sveum, 787 N.W.2d 317, 330-33 (2010). In that case, however, unlike Jones, a valid warrant was issued to authorize the installation of the GPS device. Id. 119 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 n.2 (The car belong to Jones's wife but the Court found that he had "at least the property rights of a bailee."). 120 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-353 (1967); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739, 740 (1979) ("In Katz, Government agents had intercepted the contents of a telephone conversation by attaching an electronic listening device to the outside of a public phone booth. The Court rejected the argument that a 'search' can occur only when there has been a 'physical intrusion' into a 'constitutionally protected area,' noting that the Fourth Amendment 'protects people, not places.' Because the Government's monitoring of Katz' conversation 'violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth,' the Court held that it 'constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
121 Smith, 442 U.S. at 739 ("Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a "justifiable," a "reasonable," or a "legitimate expectation of privacy" that has been invaded by government action. E.g., Rakas v. Justice Alito, in an opinion concurring in the judgment only, took issue with the majority's reliance on a trespass-based analysis.
122
Alito's opinion retained the focus of the reasonable expectation of privacy test articulated in U.S. v. Katz. 123 Relevant to the issues here, Alito's concurrence considers the often non-physical element of new technology, much of which can be installed from afar.
124
The result in Jones is clear, despite the differing rationales. Police must obtain a warrant before they can physically place a GPS tracking device on a suspect's automobile. Less clear, in part because of the differing rationales, is the decision's effect on the current crop of DV/GPS tracking laws.
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V. A VIEW TO THE FUTURE
Technology's impact on intimate terrorism-for good and for illis inescapable. On the one hand, intimate terrorists will continue to exploit new methods that expand their ability to coercively control their quarry. However, victims may be able to combat technological assaults as well as use technology to gain safety. The impact of technology will be ever-changing as technological methods advance. The following issues will require on-going attention as both law and technology evolve, doubtless at an uneven pace.
A. GPS Monitoring
Monitoring of intimate terrorists via GPS technology creates both legal and non-legal challenges. They include the constitutionality of monitoring, its efficacy, its technological capability, and its proper implementation.
Constitutionality
The constitutionality of the monitoring of intimate terrorists will vary, depending on the language of a particular statute and to whom 122 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957-59 (Alito, J., concurring) (Justice Sotomayor also wrote a concurring opinion, but she joined with Justice Scalia's opinion as well. 
127
In Jones, the U. S. Supreme Court held that placing a GPS device on the undercarriage of a car was a search for which a valid warrant was required. 128 However, the Court has also found no reasonable expectation of privacy exists as cars travel on public streets. 129 Thus, Jones provides a reasonable justification for law enforcement to attach a GPS monitoring based on tracking a device onto an automobile as it travels public thoroughfares. 130 However, a car parked in a private garage does involve reasonable expectations of privacy. 131 Therefore, GPS technology that tracks a vehicle into non-public spheres may implicate the Fourth Amendment. So may GPS capacity on devices such as a smartphone or iPad, when those are taken into non-public areas. The U.S. Supreme Court has already found that the use of technology that invades a private home requires a warrant. 132 Whether a valid reasonable expectation of privacy argument exists for the intimate terrorist will likely turn on whether the monitoring occurs pre-trial or post-conviction. In post-conviction situations, the GPS monitoring tracks whether the intimate terrorist is entering an area from which he already has been excluded by court order. In that setting, at least, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy and thus no Fourth Amendment trigger.
133
Even in those circumstances, however, GPS technology may capture movement data beyond the exclusion zones, thus raising expectation-of-privacy concerns. These circumstances may be alleviated by a monitoring technology called reverse tagging, which is only triggered when the intimate terrorist enters the exclusion zone. 134 v. 7 | 10 Several states authorize GPS monitoring of an intimate terrorist who has not yet gone to trial. 135 Here, obviously, the intimate terrorist is still the accused, not the convicted. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that probationers have a lesser liberty interest, that rationale would not hold in a pre-trial circumstance. 136 Thus, pre-trial monitoring has a greater risk of impinging on constitutional freedoms. However, if monitoring is imposed as a condition of pre-trial release, in lieu of incarceration, monitoring is less of an infringement on liberty than is confinement.
Due Process Clause challenges to monitoring have been sustained, at least in pre-trial circumstances, when imposed by statutes requiring electronic monitoring for all offenders. 137 However, DV/GPS statutes generally have an individualized component that may forestall successful Due Process challenges. In some states, for instance, the monitoring is ordered only after a dangerousness or lethality assessment. 138 Elsewhere, it is done after a finding of the risk the offender poses to the victim. 139 Equal Protection Clause issues arise if an intimate terrorist is rendered ineligible for monitoring because of penury. 140 Most GPS statutes require that the offender pay the costs of the monitoring. 141 To avert this concern, some states explicitly authorize community service or a sliding scale fee. 142 Others permit third parties or organizations to cover the cost. 143 Another approach is used in Illinois. It has instituted fines for domestic violence offenders; such fines are placed in the Domestic Violence Surveillance Fund, which may be used for low income offenders. 
Effectiveness and Technological Capacity
The efficacy of GPS monitoring is unclear. Some studies suggest that the monitoring yields a modest decline in recidivism. 145 Others suggest that there is no statistically significant difference between those on electronic monitors and a control group.
146
Even if GPS monitoring in domestic violence cases is shown to deter future incidents of domestic violence, it is only as good as the technology that supports it. There are several types of GPS devices available, including passive devices that do not transmit location data with enough frequency to enhance safety. 147 Moreover, GPS technology may depend on the cellular capacity in a region, thus creating problems for mountainous or rural areas. Problems can also arise in urban areas, due to dense building structures.
148
And nothing is perfect. Technology, or the devices that support it, can fail. There already have been lawsuits against GPS manufacturers for damages arising from a failed device.
149
Lawsuits aside, if monitoring appears to be ineffective, it will not be considered a useful tool to protect survivors.
If the device fails, the monitoring fails. If the monitoring fails, the survivor is no better off, and indeed, may be worse off, than she would 145 , a probationer in a monitoring program, entered a prohibited area and seriously injured his wife. He was not wearing a monitoring anklet at the time because a defective device had not been promptly replaced by the manufacturer. The state district appellate court denied the plaintiff's claim, holding, in part, that the trial record did not support the plaintiff's argument that the GPS device was defective when it left the manufacturer because it could have been damaged in shipment, storage, or while being used by a previous offender. Furthermore, even if the probationer had been wearing the passive GPS device at the time of the attack, the information about his movements would not have been known until after the device was plugged into his home monitoring unit. Therefore, the court reasoned, the manufacturer could not have taken action to prevent the attack, so no legal cause was established."); Gable, supra note 94, at 354-55; see also The recognition of this undesirable possibility is seen in the several statutes that specifically require a judge, before imposing monitoring on an offender, to apprise the victim of the limitations of the technology and the risks involved if the technology fails. 151 
Implementation
Assume that GPS monitoring is constitutional and that it has been demonstrated to protect victims. Further assume that GPS monitoring has a highly effective technological capacity. None of this matters if it is not being used. Several impediments may prevent monitoring from being ordered. First, it is being introduced at a time when state budgets, including budgets for courts, corrections, and probation departments, are being cut. 152 Therefore, as an unfunded mandate, it may not be instituted. Second, if defendants cannot afford to pay for it, it may not be used. Finally, some professionals in the field, including victims' advocates and prosecutors, may be loath to recommend it if they believe that it provides women with a false sense of security.
153
B. Evidentiary Issues
Technological advances lead to new evidentiary problems. 154 Many of these problems may be resolved through proper application of an appropriate evidentiary rule. For example, GPS monitoring will yield reports that demonstrate the movements of the offender, including impermissible activity in the exclusion zone. These reports may be admissible pursuant to more than one evidentiary rule. 155 Courts have a long-established history of responding to and allowing the admissibility of new technologies, whether DNA evidence or audio-frequency monitoring from an earlier time. 156 But judicial acceptance of GPS reports or other technologically related evidence will not happen overnight. Thus, there will be a period of time during which the evidence will be rejected. Further, there may be circumstances in which the evidence ought not to be admitted, due to authentication or other valid reliability flaws.
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C. Unintended Consequences
The National Institute of Justice has recently issued a study on the effectiveness of GPS monitoring. 158 It demonstrates a beneficial reduction of recidivism, at least in some jurisdictions. 159 Not all of the study's findings, however, are similarly sanguine. One finding, in fact, is quite disturbing. The study indicates that GPS monitoring is being ordered for women who have had protection orders issued against them in situations involving a non-intimate family member, such as a daughter. 160 Although perhaps counterintuitive, this outcome is possible because protection orders between two people who are not in an intimate relationship are possible. The class of protected persons in protection order statutes has been, in general, expanding. v. 7 | 10 non-intimate situations may be within the statutory purview, it foretells a larger problem. This is not the first time that unintended consequences that harm victims have arisen from efforts to combat intimate terrorism. During the 1990s, for instance, mandatory arrest of batterers was heralded as an important part of the solution; states rushed to enact these laws. 163 As a result of these laws, there was an increase in dual arrests, i.e., both the victim and the batterer were arrested simultaneously. 164 Dual arrests occurred when police, upon arriving at the scene, believed that they could not sort out the facts to accurately determine the identity of the batterer. 165 Consequently, the police arrested both the alleged victim and alleged batterer. This often happened in circumstances where both parties were wounded, but the batterer's wounds were caused defensively by the victim in an effort to protect herself.
Although the increase in dual arrest eventually led to protocols that assist the police in determining the primary aggressor, it also revealed a negative side to laws that were perceived as an important advance forward. 166 Arrest of the victim leads potentially to dual protection orders; this provided a new tool of coercion for intimate terroristsone that comes accompanied by state power. In part because of these negative consequences, mandatory arrest laws are now one of the few topics that are subject to criticism by all sides. 167 Similarly, mandatory prosecution laws, once viewed as demonstrating that domestic violence crimes will be treated as seriously as other types of crimes, are now criticized for, at best, ignoring survivors' wishes. And at their worst, these laws now result in the legal system itself coercively controlling the survivor by forcing her to bend to the will of the prosecutor. The intimate terrorist's tactics of threats and manipulation are now transformed into a prosecutorial tool. For instance, prosecutors may subpoena survivors and, if they fail to appear or testify, the prosecutor may levy criminal charges against the survivors.
168
Unintended consequences have extended beyond the arrest and prosecution of batterers. For example, judges, convinced that children may suffer harm when witnessing domestic violence, have started to consider the presence of domestic violence in the home when making custody determinations. This advance came after years of studying the effects of domestic violence on children and advocating those impacts to courts and legislatures.
Intended to protect children and mothers in the legal context of a custody battle, these gains instead have been used against adult and child survivors of intimate terrorism. Battered women have started to lose their children to foster care because the children were present in the home when the women were beaten. Thus, the rationale goes, the women had permitted their children to be exposed to domestic violence with all its pernicious effects by "allowing" the children to be at home during their mother's abuse. 169 The knowledge of this possibility may deter survivors from calling the police, based on the all-too-real fear of losing their children to foster care.
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In other child custody circumstances, battered women are losing custody of their children due to "friendly parent" provisions now engrafted onto custody statutes.
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These well-intended provisions are meant to protect children from being the victims of inter-parent squabbling. Judges are to award custody to the parent who is both more likely to encourage the child's contact with the other parent and less likely to disparage the other parent. An intimate terrorist can easily portray his victim as the "unfriendly" parent who discourages or avoids contact, thus increasing the terrorist's odds of getting custody or, perhaps, simply permitting the terrorist to use the legal system as yet another tool in aid of coercive control.
None of the above issues lend themselves to easy, clear, per se resolutions. They do illustrate, however, that advancements intended to combat intimate terrorism have a history of being used to the detriment of the victims. Initial indications suggest that DV/GPS 
VI. CONCLUSION
It has always been hard, and potentially lethal, for the Frans of this world to escape the Bobbys. Some do-these are the survivors. Others don't-these are the victims. Technology is, as often as not, an aid to the intimate terrorist. The uber-speed of technological advances can overwhelm a deliberative legal system's efforts to thwart technology's negative effects. Although the pace may be ill-matched, efforts must continue to prevent the intimate terrorist from enlarging his power through technology. Once these efforts yield results, further effort is needed to see that intimate terrorism survivors are not harmed by measures intended to aid them.
